Letter to the ICANN Board and community
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has been entrusted with the important tasks of promoting the Internet's stability and dynamism as it rapidly evolves as the world's most important infrastructure. To be able to fulfill these tasks in a way that satisfies the Internet's stakeholders, ICANN must have a structure of governance that ensures the stability, transparency and predictability of its work.
However, at its inception in 1998, key aspects of ICANN's decision and policy-making structure were left unresolved. The resulting uncertainty has come to play a large role in the work of ICANN since then, to the detriment of the core tasks ICANN has been asked to undertake. This relates primarily to the question of the so-called "At-Large Directors" of the ICANN Board.
Following decisions at its meetings in Cairo and Yokohama in March and July 2000, the ICANN Board chartered the At-Large Study Committee (ALSC) to seek a consensus on the concept, structure and processes relating to an "At-Large" membership, thus enabling ICANN to concentrate on its mission during the coming years.
The ALSC has spent the past six months exploring numerous alternatives, listening to different opinions and trying to stimulate a debate on these important issues within the wider Internet community. It has sought to facilitate different independent studies, and posted discussion papers and options in order to encourage dialogue.
Despite extensive efforts, the ALSC has found it difficult to generate a high degree of interest in these issues. We have not found profound and widespread opinions favoring any one solution to the At-Large issues. We have concluded that the main interest of the wider Internet community is in the stability and reliability of the Internet itself, and that a structure for participation and representation that is seen as creating the best possibilities for this would meet with its tacit approval.
Although outside our mandate, the ALSC has discussed whether the tasks now assigned to ICANN could be handled better or equally well by an intergovernmental organization, thus potentially securing the legitimacy of the process, ensuring a degree of public participation through regular governmental mechanisms, as well as assuring the stability of the policy and decision-making system.
We have found, however, that such an approach has several serious drawbacks. ICANN represents an effort at global self-regulation that, if successful, has great merit in a number of different ways. Engaging developers of Internet standards and providers of the domain name and address system, as well as seeking to create a voice for Internet users, results in a system that contributes both to the stability of the Internet and to its constant evolution. We do not believe that an intergovernmental system would be able to do this in the same way.
The developers and providers, now grouped in three Supporting Organizations, have a critical role in the overall system. We have discussed whether ICANN could be entrusted solely to them, thus eliminating the very profound challenges associated with an At-Large membership. However, the concerns of users are equally important to the success of ICANN's mission, thus requiring that an effective mechanism for their participation and representation in ICANN processes be found.
Based on our view of ICANN as a balance among developers, providers and users, we would recommend that the At-Large membership select a third of ICANN's Board. We have found that more narrow interests could seek to influence the ICANN process through all three avenues, but that wider and more public interests can also be found in all three.
We have spent a considerable amount of time looking at different alternatives for selecting the proposed At-Large members of the ICANN Board. We are dealing with a unique organization, with unique functions and a truly unique structure. There are no models to follow.
In spite of our efforts, we have failed to find any system for the selection of At-Large Directors that is completely failsafe from every possible point of view.
Using e-mail addresses as the basis for voting rights, as tested last year, has significant drawbacks, and is obviously open to national capture. In addition, we have not found any way of conducting a pure online election involving e-mail address holders with even moderate confidence that capture or fraud has been prevented, thus creating the need for a combination of online and mail processes which not only is complicated, but which also risks totally undermining the finances of ICANN. In spite of being superficially attractive, closer scrutiny makes clear that this is not a viable option.
We have thus decided to recommend a system with voting rights based on domain names, and we have proposed the creation of a system in which those domain name holders wishing to be part of the process also become part of the process of setting up an At-Large Supporting Organization (ALSO). In our view, the emergence of an ALSO would greatly facilitate the process of articulating wider issues in the ICANN process, thus also strengthening the role of the At-Large members between the elections. We are seeking to create an At-Large membership that is, at least to some degree, committed to the tasks of ICANN.
There are issues with a system in which domain name holders are given the option of becoming part of an ALSO and taking part in elections that need further discussion and elaboration (e.g. there might be some risk of capture, although less than in the email-based case). There are also significant technical issues that need to be addressed. We do see, however, the possibility of a pure online election process with adequate safeguards, and we do see the possibility of a smooth integration of the financing of ALSO activities, including the elections, with the domain name payment system. In our opinion, these are critical advantages to this approach over any other so far discussed.
We see the need to elect the six At-Large Directors of ICANN's Board from six different regions in the world, and have suggested for discussion, a division we believe is appropriate. This will be a larger number than at present, although less than envisaged earlier. We have also indicated how an ALSO with a local and regional structure might evolve from these elections.
Although there are significant implementation issues that need to be resolved, we consider it realistic to aim at having elections next year for the suggested six At-Large Directors, and would recommend that these be elected for a period of three years. This would not only give the ICANN Board a period of stability in which it can concentrate on its important tasks, but would also give time for the establishment of the suggested ALSO, thus putting in place a mechanism for the articulation of different interests and points of view prior to the next election.
As the Internet is a system in rapid evolution, ICANN must be an organization open to change over time. We hope that a period of stability in its structures would make it possible for ICANN to contribute to the evolution of the Internet in different ways. We would consider it natural that an evaluation of the system of governance of ICANN in its entirety be done after experience with two ALSO elections and the intervening period.
These are our draft recommendations, which we are now submitting for public discussion and comment. As we indicate, there are numerous issues where we see the need for further discussions and elaboration. Based on this discussion and further work, we are committed to presenting a final recommendation to the ICANN Board prior to its meeting in Los Angeles in November.
The ALSC: Carl Bildt (Chair), Chuck Costello (Vice Chair), Pierre Dandjinou, Esther Dyson, Olivier Iteanu, Ching-Yi Liu, Thomas Niles, Oscar Robles, and Pindar Wong (Vice Chair).
Contents
Letter to the ICANN Board and community
Executive Summary
Introduction
Background
The ALSC
ALSC Outreach
At-Large Membership Participation
Recommended Membership Alternative
Individual Domain Name Holders
"Individual Domain Name Holder" Defined
Creating an At-Large Membership
ALSO
ALSO Framework
At-Large Membership Representation
Membership Registration/Election Processes
Potential Process Elements
Conclusion/Next Steps
Appendix
Background on ICANN http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm
ALSC Charter
http://www.icann.org/committees/at-large-study/charter-22jan01.htm
ALSC Members http://www.atlargestudy.org/members.shtml
ALSC Forum Comments http://www.atlargestudy.org/forum.shtml
ALSC list of outreach events and meetings
http://www.atlargestudy.org/calendar.shtml
Summary of ALSC outreach events, working meetings
http://www.atlargestudy.org/meetinginfo.shtml
ALSC "Call for Studies" and list of submissions
http://www.atlargestudy.org/studies list.shtml
ALSC Discussion Paper #1
http://www.atlargestudy.org/DiscussionPaper1.shtml
ALSC Option template http://www.atlargestudy.org/template.shtml
Election Data http://www.atlargestudy.org/documents.shtml
Extensible Provisioning Protocol
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/provreg-charter.html
ISO 3166-1 list
http://www.din.de/gremien/nas/nabd/iso3166ma/codlstp1/index.html
ALSC Draft Report on ICANN At-Large Membership
Executive Summary
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Board of Directors chartered the At-Large Membership Study Committee (ALSC), as provided by Article II, Section 5 of the ICANN Bylaws, to forge a consensus on "effective means by which the diverse global Internet communities and stakeholders may participate in ICANN's policy development, deliberations, and actions." The ALSC proposes, as draft recommendations to ICANN's Board of Directors "At-Large member" be defined as "individual domain name holder," a new "At-Large Supporting Organization" (ALSO) be created to help represent the public interest and foster informed participation by individuals in ICANN, and a geographically-based ALSO member election be instituted to simultaneously provide members for six directly-elected Regional At-Large Councils and one (international) At-Large Council, and six directly-elected At-Large Directors to serve on ICANN's Board. The At-Large Councils would help build and manage a self-organizing, self-funding, transparent ALSO that would serve as a local and regional-based framework for collecting and defining views, engaging members, enabling consensus decision-making, and working closely with other Supporting Organizations on policy development.
The ALSC has spent the last six months studying At-Large issues and seeking input from all interested parties, and continues to work to achieve a broad consensus on effective means by which Internet users (At-Large members) may participate in ICANN's policy formulation and decision-making. We have worked without preconceptions about the outcome and have carefully considered the full spectrum of potential At-Large participatory and representational mechanisms - from zero to 100 percent of the Board seats selected by an At-Large membership - and from an inter-governmental model representing individuals to directly involving all of the world's e-mail-address holders.
We found there to be great value in ICANN's existing bottom-up approach and in the involvement of At-Large members to strengthen the focus on Internet users' interests. However, we do not accept the notion that users' interests are somehow exclusively or even best protected by selecting half of the Board's Directors. Nor do we believe that users' interests can be properly represented through a system that relies on e-mail addresses to identify individuals; such an approach is administratively and financially unworkable on a global scale for a sizeable electorate, and fraught with potential dangers ranging from capture to outright fraud. Furthermore, experience has already shown that it is costly and difficult to manage and does not effectively handle many people in regions that use non-Latin script or have inefficient postal systems.
Instead, we have found the requirement that members hold a domain name to be a useful way of identifying individuals, reaching them (initially) in a decentralized way through registrars and ensuring their direct interest in the Internet infrastructure that is ICANN's central concern. (Any e-mail address holder can acquire a domain name at minimal cost, but with some effort. To help ensure that this is not an impediment to those who want a domain name and want to be an At-Large member, the ALSC suggests that the ICANN community identify and encourage organizations that could provide appropriate assistance to such users.)
We believe the approach with the best chance for consensus support is addressing Internet users' interests by organizing ICANN along stakeholder interest or functional lines of developers, providers and users, by defining At-Large members as "individual domain name holders" (since they have a strong and tangible vested interest in ICANN activities, not just the Internet in general), and by providing these At-Large members with the opportunity to fully participate in ICANN and select one-third of its Board. Obviously, this is only one of many possible approaches; we endeavored to find one that could win broad support. We propose the At-Large user "community" include institutions, but only individuals may vote. Institutions already play a greater role in the existing Supporting Organizations, so this seems an appropriate balance. We encourage your input on this issue.
To launch the ALSO membership, we recommend that ICANN undertake an outreach effort and that organizers work with the registrars to use the domain name registration infrastructure to notify current and future individual domain name holders and give them an opportunity to join and financially support a new ALSO.
We recommend that the ALSO framework and elections be based on six geographic regions, and that guidelines be established to foster an ALSO that can develop and present policy advice to the Board on issues that affect Internet users' interests and that are within ICANN's specific technical and administrative mission. (Careful attention to ICANN's constrained mission should render it less attractive as a vehicle to "capture" and make sure that the public does not expect ICANN to remedy problems or solve disputes not within its narrow competence.)
We recommend that Directors be elected for three-year terms and that the At-Large be re-evaluated after two election cycles. This would provide At-Large with time to develop and provide ICANN with stability and an opportunity to implement any necessary changes to At-Large participation and representation mechanisms based on six years of experience. Clearly, timely outreach, development and management efforts will be necessary to implement our recommendations. The ALSC assumes there will be a need for committees or working groups and requests input on potential implementation measures. We will seek to develop specific, consensus recommendations on execution for the Board's consideration.
We think a consensus can form that an ALSO's organized participation mechanisms and election processes will fulfill the mission of involving individuals and representing their interests in ICANN's policy development and decision-making structure and processes. Individual domain name holders, as users, have a significant stake in ICANN's activities and should have the opportunity of fully participating in ICANN. The creation of elected, geographically diverse At-Large Councils with the responsibility to build a framework for At-Large participation and attention to users' voices is essential. At-Large representation without a mechanism for structured participation in policy development does not fulfill the spirit or intent of ICANN's guiding principles. The ALSO should also strengthen the link to people who have demonstrated a commitment to ICANN's mission and support informed participation in ICANN's technical coordination of the Internet's domain name and address system.
In proposing these draft recommendations on the role of an At-Large membership, our intention is to help create a policy and decision-making structure and process within ICANN that fosters understanding and accommodation among various interests, including individual Internet users. We believe we are recommending such a structure, one that has potential for consensus support and will help ensure that ICANN's policies truly reflect the needs, interests and rights of all its stakeholders - including those who may not agree with some resulting policies but who will ideally feel that at least their positions were understood and fairly considered. Finally, we do believe that attention to the interests of all stakeholders is likely to produce transparent policies that will indeed make the Internet operate more smoothly and reliably and with broader public support over time.
We have concluded that no system exists for incorporating an "At-Large" membership that would fully satisfy all interests, because this is a world of limited resources in which compromises must be made and priorities set in all spheres of activity. We also recognize that our recommended approach is not foolproof (i.e. vulnerability to capture of a geographic region would still exist.) We believe, however, that this is the most balanced, reasonable approach currently available, and that we are outlining a system that is generally fair and that involves those individuals who have an active interest in ICANN's activities. It focuses At-Large membership on an identifiable and vested community, provides a reasonable mechanism for registration and self-funding, offers a framework for users' structured participation, and grants individual users a proportionate responsibility for selecting ICANN's Board (along with providers and developers in the DNSO, ASO, PSO and others). Our draft recommendations are issued for the consideration of all interested individuals and organizations. We look forward to receiving constructive input that helps us fulfill our charter and contributes to a final report that can be issued in November 2001 and leads to implementation through the following year and beyond.
